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Abstract:
Optimal intertemporal investment solution paths are derived for both, firms
operating in perfect financial markets and those facing credit constraints, due
to imperfect capital markets. However, as in these markets, saving and
investment decision may not be separable, we obtain the optimal dynamic path
of these decisions for agents that own capital but do not have any access to
credit and extend the analysis when these agents have some access to credit
but yet face credit constraints from financial intermediaries.
We next consider agents without physical capital and who derived their
income from wages and/or financial assets. We study their optimal
intertemporal decisions, among, consumption, financial assets and durable
goods, first under perfect capital markets and then when credit constraints are
present.
The above results may be useful for both, the comparative dynamic analysis of
agents with different type of endowments and immersed in imperfect financial
markets and also to derive, from micro foundations, the aggregate demand and
supply functions of intertemporal macro models for developing economies.
The distinction between different types of agents according to their
endowment may also help to assess the wealth and income distribution
implications of economic policy.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert M. Solow
Title: Professor Emeritus of Economics
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Introduction.
A common critique of
Neoclassical Economic Theory is that this theory assumes perfectly
competitive markets. In particular, it is argued that capital markets
imperfections prevailing in developing countries may render this theory
irrelevant for said economies. In addition, the assumption of equally endowed
agents precludes the analysis of any income and wealth distribution effects of
macroeconomic policy.
Using neoclassical growth and investment theories as a
point of reference this thesis studies the optimal intertemporal decisions of
agents in imperfect capital markets.
The deterministic neoclassical theory of investment
by the firm is extended, first in Chapter I to obtain investment solution paths
for convex but not necessarily quadratic investment expenditure functions. In
Chapter II we study how the previously derived results should be modified
when firms' access to credit is constrained. However in imperfect capital
markets, saving and investment decision may not be separable, thus in Chapter
III we derive optimal dynamic strategies for agents that own capital but do not
have access to credit. Building on this background, in Chapter IV we analyze
how these strategies should be modified when these agents have access to
credit, but, due to imperfections in the capital markets, face quantity
constraints from financial intermediaries.
5
If credit is rationed in proportion to the amount of
physical capital that an agent has, a further implication of imperfect capital
markets is that we may need to distinguish between agents that own capital
and those who do not. Chapter V studies the optimal intertemporal decisions
of agents without physical capital and who derived their income from wages
and operate in perfect capital markets. This serves as a background for the
analysis in Chapter VI of the same type of agents but immersed in imperfect
capital markets.
In these last two chapters we also introduce interest
earning financial assets, money, as well as durable goods as an alternative to
the consumption of non-durables. Although not undertaken in this work, the
analysis in Chapter IV can be readily extended to include these three assets by
following the same techniques presented in Chapter V and VI.
The methodology developed in this work may be
useful in analyzing the comparative dynamics of different types of individual
agents in imperfect financial markets. In addition, the introduction of interest
earning financial assets, money and durable goods enables the techniques
developed here to provide the micro foundations for the aggregate demand
and supply functions of intertemporal macro models aimed at analyzing
diverse fiscal and monetary policy issues in economies with imperfect
financial markets. Lastly, the distinction between agents that have physical
capital and those that do not and who derive their income mostly from wages
and/or financial assets may also allow us to use this analysis to address some
6
basic wealth and income distribution implications of macroeconomic policy in
emerging economies where these issues are consider of strategic relevance.
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I.- Neoclassical Intertemporal Production and Investment with
Constant Returns to Scale.
I.-A. Introduction.
If firms could rent in any desired volume all their input
services for an arbitrary short period with the corresponding transaction costs
being either non-existent or in strict proportion to the volume of services
rented, then, production decisions among different points in time would be
independent of each other and consequently no need of a strategy through time
for the hiring of input services would arise.
When in a closer approximation to reality we regard
firms as owning stocks of production inputs which cannot be instantaneously
adjusted to any level and with non-proportional costs of adjustment, production
decisions are no longer time inter-independent. We will consider investment to be the
process by which adjustments to the capital stock are made, encompassing both, the
purchase and the installation of capital goods. If installation costs increase with the
rate of investment then investment should be distributed through time in an optimal
manner. The necessity of formulating an optimal investment plan may be furthered if
this process is irreversible.
Before stating formally the decision problem of the
neoclassical firm I shall make the following assumptions.
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Output possibilities are a function of capital (K) assigned
to the production process and labor (L) employed and are described for any
time (t) by:
F (K(t), L(t)), F > 0, K(t) > 0, L(t)> 0
Thus, F () is assumed time invariant with,
Fk >0 Fi >0
and
Fkk < 0; Fi1 < 0; FkkF1 (Fkl) 2
To ease the analysis lets assure the existence of an
interior solution by assuming Inada conditions,
lim -- ) = +ooi-+0 (L/
lim k- = +oo
k- (aF
SF\
lim -- = 0
1-+oo 8L
lim - =) 0
k-ow Ok /
Letting q be the price of new capital goods I, the
investment process involves the disbursement of funds for the purchase of
equipment by an amount qI plus an installation cost described by the function
G(I), thus total investment outlay H is:
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and
H(q, I) = q 1 + G(I)
The function G(I) will be assumed convex i.e.,
installation cost increase at an increasing rate. Since qI is a linear function, H
exhibits similar properties as G(I) see Figure I-1 thus H'>0 and H' '>0
H
H
G
q.I
Figure I-1
The convexity of H ()provides an incentive to the
firm to distribute its investment over time.
The production function F( ) and the installation
function G( ) and H( ) are assumed to be additively separable, thus F( ) and
H(I ) are likewise.
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The firm lacks the ability to influence the price of the
goods it produces p, nor can it influence the wage rate w or q. Thus p(t), w(t)
and q(t) are exogenous and will be assumed constant through time. The
opportunity cost of funds to the shareholders r is assumed likewise.
Furthermore, the labor, equipment and goods markets are of such nature that
the firm can contract all the labor it wants at the given w, sell at the given p,
all the output it cares to produce and purchase an unlimited amount of capital
goods at its constant price q. Installed capital depreciates at a constant rate.
Given the recursive nature of the optimization
problem, the optimal production and investment plans should maximize the
present value of the firm over the planning horizon subject to the capital
accumulated in the past, net of depreciation. Thus the objective will be to
maximize for the current and subsequent periods - taken as a whole -the
discounted cash-flow net of investment disbursements. Aware of the
inadequacy of an arbitrarily limited time horizon and of the sensitivity of the
results of the optimization problem to arbitrarily specified terminal conditions,
the optimization horizon of the firm will be thought of as indefinitely long and
formally modeled as infinite.
I.-B. The Formal Problem.
Formally, the neoclassical producer problem
discussed in the preceding section may be stated as,
12
oMax. f tpF(L, K) - wL - H(I)) exp -rt dt
Subject to, the transition law
k= I - 6K
The non-negative constraint on the state variable,
K 0
The non-negative constraint on labor,
L > 0
The initial condition
K(O) = KO
I.-C. Bibliographical Note.
The preceding problem with some variations has
been address in the neoclassical theory of investment where the role of convex
cost of adjusting the capital stock has been study by Eisner and Strotz (1963),
Treadway (1971), Lucas (1967), Gould (1968) and Jorgenson (1973).
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With a variety of heuristic arguments, calculus of
variations or optimal control techniques, exact solutions paths have been
obtained for the case of a quadratic investment cost function. Abel (1978) and
Sargent (1979) exemplify such solutions.
The narrow purpose of this chapter is to generalize
the solution to the above stated problem for a convex but not necessarily
quadratic investment cost function. The solution obtained will be a useful
point of reference for the work undertaken in the following chapters where a
similar investment cost function will be used.
I.-D. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions.
Since it will turn out that the non-negative
constraints on K and L do not become binding along optimal trajectories, we
shall ignore them and write the current value Hamiltonian as
H = pF (K, L) - wL HQI)+ A(I - MK )
From where we obtain the following set of necessary conditions:
X+ pFK(KL) = (6 + r)A
H'(I) =A
pFL= w
14
k = I - K
As argued by Arrow and Kurz (1971, p. 49) if we
complement the above set of necessary conditions with the following
transversality conditions,
lim exp -rtA > 0;
t -4+00
lim exp -rtA K = 0
t -4+00
The resulting set of equations is both sufficient and necessary for optimality.
I.-E. Economic Interpretation of the Necessary Conditions.
The equation
A + pFK(K,L)= (6 + r)A
states that the realized return of capital (left-hand side) which is the sum of the
capital appreciation A and the value of the marginal product of capital is equal
to the required return (right-hand side).
The equation
H'(I) = A
states that the shadow price of capital equals the marginal cost of installed
capital.
The equation
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FL = w/p
implies that labor is utilized up to the point where its marginal product equals
the exogenously fixed real wage.
I.-F. Solution Paths for the Constant Returns to Scale Case
Consider the two non-differential equations in the
above set of necessary conditions, since Fz > 0 and H'>0, we may solve for
the control variables I (t) and L(t) to get
(1) I(t) =H
(2) L(t) = Fj~ 1(w/p,K)
If we now substitute these expressions for I and L in
the differential equations that conform the set of necessary conditions, we may
re-express such set with the following system of two differential equations in
A and K:
(3.a) i = (6 + r)A - pFK [ Fi '(w/p) ; K]
(3.b) k = H' (A) - K
With constant returns to scale we may rewrite equation (2) as
(4) L = Fi~'(w/p)K
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Since the derivative of a linear homogeneous function is homogeneous of
degree cero and therefore, may be written in a multiplicative separable form.
Again, since F( ) is homogeneous of degree one, FK
is homogeneous of degree cero, thus for any constant b
Fk = Fk(bL,bK)
now let b = 1/K t then,
Fk = Fk( L/K, K/K)
In this last equation we now substitute the value of L
given by equation (4) and since w/p is an exogenous constant we have,
Fk = Fk[ F-1 (w/p); 1]
Or, Fk = f
where f is a constant. If we now substitute this result in equation system (3)
we see that the first equation is independent of the second and may be
rewritten as
. - ( S + r)t = -pf
this has as general solution
pf
(8 + r) + Aexp(8 +r)t
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where A is a constant. However for A to meet the transversality conditions, A
must be zero, hence
A* (t) 65+ r
Thus the shadow price of installed capital is constant.
Now substituting the solution for A(t) obtained in the above paragraph, we
have the solution for I (t),
I*(t) = H'1 ( pf
8+ r )
Again note I* is constant.
Substitute this solution for I(t) in the second equation
of system (3) and the capital accumulation differential equation becomes
k = I* - SK
which now may be solved to obtain the solution path for K(t)
1* I
K*(t) =- + {K(0) - - exp(-8)t
From the solution path for K(t), we notice that as
time elapses the asymptotic value of K(t) tends to I*/6 i.e.,
K* 0 lim K*(t)= -
t-+8o
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By transposing we may also express the constant rate
of investment in terms of the steady state capital stock:
1* = 8K*
Substituting this value of I* in the third before last
equation we may express the rate of capital accumulation as a function of the
steady state capital stock,
k = 8 {K"o - K(t)}
From the necessary conditions we solved for the
control L(t) obtaining equation (2) later shown susceptible to be rewritten as
L = FJ'(w/p ) K(t)
Substituting in our solution path for K(t) we have the
employment solution path
=F (W
'5 + (K(0) -
4 /A7\ 1*
L*0 = lim L* (t) = F,
t -4+00 P
Below we sketch the solution path I(t), K(t), L(t) and A(t).
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L*(t)
Hence,
1* exp(-6)t
I
IFigure 1-2
K
K(O)
Figure 1-3
20
LFlI (w/p) P/5 t ------------------------------
L(O)
Figure 1-4
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t
p.f / (s+r)
Figure 1-5
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I.-G. Phase Diagram for Constant Returns to Scale.
Since the system of equations that constitute
necessary conditions is time invariant and we have only two state variables,
K(t) and A(t), we can draw a phase diagram in this space.
From the necessary conditions of the optimization
problem we obtained
A = ( 6 + r)A - pF
later rewritten as
A - (d + r)A. = -pf
Thus the locus for i = Ois,
A = pf/(d + r)
d)L
Since the right-hand side is a constant, -= 0 and
the 4 = 0 locus has zero slope in the K, A space.
When we substituted the expression for I(t) in terms of
2 -equation (1)- in the transition law we obtained,
k = H'~1 (A) - 6K
23
the
From where we may obtain the equation of the k=0 locus.
K = 1/6 H'1' (A)
or
A = H'(8 K)
Since we assumed H"> 0, this locus has a positive slope
and is strictly convex for H functions of higher than second degree - when H is
quadratic then the loci K=0 is a positive sloped straight line as Figure 1 in Abel
(op.cit., p. 111).
If we further assume A > H'(0) , we would assure that
K*>0 and we can draw the following phase diagram where the arrowed line shows
the unique optimal Pontryagin path.
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i=0
K'"
Figure 1-6
I.-H. Summarizing Proposition.
We summarize the results obtained so far in the
following proposition.
Proposition: A firm with constant returns to scale
aiming to maximize the present value of its discounted cash-flow over an
indefinitely long horizon, facing constant r, p, q, w, and with convex costs of
adjusting its stock of capital will:
a) Invest at a constant rate given by
25
I* (t) = H'-'( pf
+ r )
b) Hire at each point in time labor up to the level where the
value of the marginal product as determined by the current stock of capital equals the
exogenous real wage.
c) Have K and L evolving according to the
equations:
K*(t) =
L*(t)
+ {K() - L exp(-S)t
= F( (w)K*(t)
d) Approach asymptotically
levels of capital stock and employment
K -0 H'6
pf
in time the following
)
I.-I. Concluding Remarks.
This chapter has served, both, as a review of the
existent literature and as an introduction to the forthcoming analysis. Besides
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presenting the results of previous work on the topic we have also shown how
the assumption of a linear homogeneous production function can be exploited
to reduce the set of necessary conditions to two differential equations, (3.a)
and (3.b), which may be solved independently of each other to obtain exact
solution paths for the more general case of convex but not necessarily
quadratic investment cost functions. This eases the forthcoming work because
unlike Abel (op.cit.) we did not need to take linear approximations to the
steady state or unlike Sargent (op.cit.) we need not restrict the analysis to
quadratic investment cost functions.
27
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II.- Intertemporal Production and Investment Decisions in
Imperfect Capital Markets.
II.-A. Introduction.
The producer problem as formalized in Chapter I
does not consider any constraint on the amount of funds available to the firm
for investment purpose, hence, it tacitly assumes perfect financial markets in
the sense that the firm can borrow as much as it considers optimal.
To assess the implications of capital market
imperfections Appelbaum and Harris (1978) studied the effect on the time
path of the capital stock when firms cannot float new debt and current
earnings must be either distributed to shareholders or spent on current
acquisition of capital goods but cannot be retained for future acquisition of
capital goods. Schworm (1980) extends this analysis for the cases when the
firm can retain earnings and when the firm can, both, retain earnings and
borrow at a rate that depends on the amount of outstanding debt and which is
paid on all outstanding debt. However no justification is given as to why
capital market imperfections should constrain the firm in such way.
In order to have a theoretical base for the
specification of the restrictions that capital market imperfections will pose on
the economic agents it seems to me that first we must identify such
imperfections and analyze their implications on the behavior of the existent
29
financial institutions. Only then will we be able to determine the terms and
restrictions on the availability of credit to the individual agents.
Kurz (1976) studies in the context of a general
equilibrium model the behavior of financial intermediaries when due to the
incompleteness of insurance markets, individual agents cannot insure
themselves against the possibility of bankruptcy and shows that under these
circumstances "some quantity constraints will appear in the remaining
functioning markets and these constraints will be determined endogenously
like prices and provide essential allocative signals. ... the non existence of
bankruptcy insurance induces financial intermediaries to undertake some
insurance function and the difference between the borrowing and lending rates
reflect the insurance premium". (op.cit. p. 45). However, in Kurz's analysis,
individual borrowing agents do not posses physical capital, rather they have an
endowment which may be either consumed or invested. It seems to me that if
Kurz's analysis is extended to consider firms endowed with physical capital
which cannot be sold without the consent of the financial institution with
which the firm is indebted, the quantity credit constraint to the firm will be
proportional to the capital stock it owns.
To extend Kurz's analysis in the above described
fashion would take us to far afield, instead, lead by existent evidence we will
proceed to consider firms that cannot insure themselves against the possibility
of bankruptcy and that may finance their capital accumulation with either net
revenue or credit, with the latter constrained not to exceed a certain proportion
"a" of the value of the firm's current capital stock. We then have that the
30
maximization of the firms discounted cash-flow is subject to a liquidity
constraint,
pF(K, L) - wL - H (I) + D - iD O 0
and a credit constraint,
aK - D 0
We shall continue to hold the assumptions stated in
the introduction to Chapter I and study now the effects of the above financial
constraints on the firm with constant returns to scale.
II.-B. The Formal Problem.
The firm's problem now is:
Max V(O) =
Subject to:
The transition law:
The liquidity constraint:
[pFC)- wL - H(I)] exp(-r)t dt
IK= 1(t) SK(t)
pF(K,L)- wL D - iD 0
31
- H (I) +
The credit rationing constraint:
aK(t) - D(t) 0
The non-negative constraints on:
Instruments:
I(t) 0 ; L(t) 0
State variable:
K(t) 0
The initial conditions:
K(0) = KO; D(O) = Do
We are interested in studying the effects on the
optimal investment, employment, capital stock and output paths of the firm
when either one or both of the liquidity and the credit constraints may be
binding.
An initial conjecture for such circumstances
is that none of the constraints
I(t) 0 ; L(t) 0 ; K(t) 0
are effective along the optimal trajectories of the preceding problem and so
will be assumed in order not to clutter the exposition. If for the cases below
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considered, the solution we obtain violates anyone of the constraints we have
just assumed ineffective, our analysis would have to be modified, but if all
constraints are fulfilled then no further qualifications will be necessary.
II.-C. The Necessary Conditions.
II-.-C.1 The current value Hamiltonian for boundary segments.
Our treatment of boundary segments follows Hadley
and Kemp (1971). Along boundary segments we have
(i) aK(t) - D(t) = 0
To deal with this constraint -unlike what will be done for the liquidity
constraint- we cannot form a Hamiltonian by attaching the constraint to the
objective function a-la Lagrange, because there would be no direct way in
which the control variables could be affected to insure the constraint's
fulfillment. However given constraint (i) it must be true that,
(ii) ak - D = 0
while the constraint (i) is effective. Hence we can form the following
Hamiltonian,
H=pF)- wL -H(I)+D-iD+A (I-SK) -rpF(KL)- wL -H(I) +6-iD]- v(ak - I)
Since,
(iii) K = I(t) - SK(t)
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the channel through which control variables influence may assure the
satisfaction of the original constraint (i) is made explicit by substituting
equation (iii) in (ii) obtaining,
a(I - 8K) -b = 0
And consequently the previous Hamiltonian may be rewritten as:
H=pF()- wL-H(I)+D -i D + A (I- 6K) - rq[pF(KL)-wL -H(I)+L6-iD]-v[(a(I-K)--6]
II.-C.2 The necessary conditions along boundary segments.
From the last Hamiltonian we may obtain the following set of necessary
conditions:
-A +rA = pF- AS - llpFk + vaS
-9 + rv =77i
Kt= I(t) - SK(t)
-r7 + V 0
pF - w - rypFi +rw =7 0
-H'(1) + A + 1H'(I) - va = 0
?7{pF)- w L - H(I)+ b - iD I = 0
34
pF(K,L) - wL- H(I) + D - iD 0
II.-C.3 The current value Hamiltonian for interior segments.
For interior segments along which aK - D > 0, the
constraint aK - D > 0 is being met as a strict inequality hence we could
ignore it in forming the Hamiltonian corresponding to the periods when the
credit constraint is not binding, from where we could derive a set of necessary
conditions valid for interior segments. Thus the set of necessary conditions
would vary according to the specific Hamiltonian from which they are
derived.
II.-C.4 The general set of necessary conditions.
A general set of necessary conditions that would
apply irrespective of whether the credit constraint is binding may be specified
by attaching a Kuhn-Tucker like devise to the set of necessary conditions
derived for boundary segments that would reduce such set to the one
corresponding to interior segments. Let such devise be the following system of
relations
v (aK - D) = 0
aK - D 0
35
v > 0
then, when aK - D > 0 , v is zero, the necessary conditions derived for
boundary segments reduce to those valid along interior segments.
Thus rearranging the previous set of necessary
conditions and attaching the above Kuhn-Tucker devise we have the following
set of general necessary conditions:
(1) - i + r2 = pFk- A8 - rpFk + va6
(2)
(3)
= 7i
Ik
(4) -r7 +
= I(t) SK(t)
v = 0
W
L =Fj(-)
p
I = H (
(7) ir{pFo- w L - H(I)+ b - iD} = 0
(8) pF(K,L)-wL -
(9) r7 0
(10) v(aK -D) =
H(I) + b - i 0
0
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(5)
(6)
(11) aK - D 0
(12) v 0
Transversality conditions:
(13) lim exp(-r)t A 0; lim(-r)t 2(t)K(t) = 0
t-n t-+o
II.-D. Optimal Growth Strategies.
We now discuss the way in which the set of general
necessary conditions and the transversality conditions jointly characterize the
solution.
II.D.1 The Case i = r
Assume initially we have
pF[K(0),L(0))] - wL(0) + aK(0) :; H(Ii*) = H(I*)
where I* and I* denote, respectively the optimal investment level if either, the
firm could borrow unrestrictedly at a rate (i) or if it had a revenue sufficiently
large to finance, entirely from revenue, the optimal investment level that
corresponds to a discount rate (r) and H(I,*_i) is the associated level of
expenditures. Thus, initially the un-constrained case solution is not feasible
since it violates either the liquidity or the credit constraint or both.
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Now consider the implications of equations (7) and
(10), in each of these equations one of the two factors of the left-hand side
must be zero. Suppose,
pF(K, L) - wL - H (I) + b - iD =
aK - D = 0
then by transposing in the next to the last equation, the solution would have,
H(I) = pF) - wL i D
with
D = aK
and hence
b = ak
that is
H(I*) = pF) - w L + ak - iaK
and,
+ ak - iaK]
and
0
P* = H'-1 [pF) - w L
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With the firm devoting at every time all of its
revenue and credit resources to investment, the capital stock will become ever
larger approaching oo as t -> oo thus violating the transversality conditions.
On the other hand if in equations (7) and (10), r;
and v are zero then our solution becomes that of the unconstrained case,
namely H(I,*-i), which satisfies the transversality conditions but would violate
either equation (8) or equation (11) or both.
The optimal solution will then be to initially set
H(I) = pF( ) - w L + ak - iaK
and follow this policy until
pFQ - w L + ak - i aK
Reaches H(I*=i) then at that point in time neither the liquidity nor the credit
constraint are effective and the solution is that of the unconstrained case i.e.
H(I,*=i) and,
I* = H'1 (p F ) 1 (p Fk)H [ k
Figure II- 1 illustrates the solution when (i) = (r) and
pF[K(0),L(0))] - wL(O) + aK(O) < H(Ii*)
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The firm initially devotes all of its revenue and credit
to investment. As the optimal stock grows the firm will have, both, ever larger
credit and revenue. Eventually, say beyond t1 , the sum of revenue and
available credit will be larger than H(I*r=), although beyond t1 , an investment
rate higher than I*, is feasible it is not optimal. The firm will at t1 stop
increasing the level of investment setting it at the constant rate I*,=,.
From ti onwards, the firm has some lee-way in
choosing the mixture of credit and revenue with which to finance its
investment, with (i) = (r) the firm would be indifferent among feasible
mixtures. If we assume for definiteness that the firm prefers to finance
investment entirely from its revenue and use credit only as needed, then, after
t1 the firm will be borrowing at a decreasing rate, finally at say, t 2 - see
Figure II-1 - borrowing stops since it is possible to finance investment entirely
from current revenue. Thus at t 2 the accumulated debt of the firm is the area
in Figure II- 1, from to to t2 between investment expenditures (continuous
curve) and revenue (dotted curve) plus the initial stock of debt.
If, for say credit rating considerations, the firm starts
paying back its debt as soon as its revenue exceeds its investment expenditures
and continuous devoting all revenue in excess of investment expenditure to
debt repayment, then until the area from t 2 , to say, t 3 between the revenue
curve and the investment expenditures line equals accumulated debt
repayment, inclusive of interest charges, will the firm start distributing
dividends.
40
ti t2 t3
Figure II-1
To study the effects of the optimal investment policy
above described on the evolution of the capital stock, we may portray such
policy in the K, I, plane.
Thek = 0 locus in the K, I, space may be derived
from the transition equation by setting k = 0 to obtain,
I = 8K
41
$
H(I*,)
t
We draw this locus in Figure 11-2. Any point above this locus would have
I > K which implies k > 0 since investment would be larger than what is
necessary to make-up for depreciation. Similarly any point below the k =
0 locus implies k < 0 . We denote this trend for K by placing arrowheads in
the corresponding regions of the K, I, plane in Figure 11-2.
The investment level which the firm would like to
undertake if it could ignore the financial constraint is the solution of the
unconstrained firm we obtained in Chapter I,
(p F)
I* = H'- [ ])
6 + i
We mark this investment level with a broken line in
Figure 11-2
If at low initial K levels the firm does not have
enough revenue to finance the optimal unconstrained investment level, the
optimal policy of the firm is first, to borrow as much as possible and devote all
of its revenue and credit to investment. Thus, with
D =aK
and
b =ak
The level of investment expenditures is
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H(I) = pF )- w L + ak - i aK
With constant returns to scale, the first two terms on
the right hand side of this last equation equal pFkK and by substituting the
transition law in the third term we have,
H(I) = pFkK - a (I - 6K)- i aK
Defining
E(I) H(I) - aI
We may write the one before last equation as
E(I) = [pFk - a( 8 + i)] K
Since H(I) is a convex and H(I) is linear, E(I) will
also be convex, strictly monotonic and hence its inverse exist. Thus we may
solve for I in the last equation to obtain,
I = E -1 { [ pF - a(8 + i)] K}
Because E(I) is convex, this last equation is a
concave function as portrayed in Figure 11-2.
Once the capital stock has grown to a level, say K1
in Figure 11-2, at which current revenue and credit suffice to finance the
optimal unconstrained level of investment, the firm will use any further
increase in revenue to distribute dividends and/or retire outstanding debt and
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will continue with such level of investment indefinitely, hence the stock of
capital will grow asymptotically in time towards K' in Figure 11-2.
This steady stat level of K is the same as the one of
the financially unconstrained firm, the only difference being that during the
period when the financial constraint is effective the firm has a lower
investment level and hence accumulates capital slower than the unconstrained
firm.
Since if the firm begins with a K > K' the financial
constraint would not be effective the optimal investment level would also be
(p F)I = H' 1  Fk)
r + 8
and the capital stock would diminish asymptotically towards K'. The optimal
investment policy is denoted with the arrowed trajectory in Figure 11-2.
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Figure 11-2
II.-D.2 The Case i > r
If excluding the possibility of lending, the
opportunity cost of funds of the shareholders is r such that i > r, the optimal
investment policy is to first invest all the revenue and credit resources until at
K1 , in Figure 111-3, when enough capital has been accumulated so that revenue
and credit are sufficient to finance,
(p Fk)i H [
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K
which is the optimal investment when the opportunity cost of funds is i. Since
at investment levels higher than I* the return on marginal investment
expenditures would be lower than i, the firm would not be willing to finance
such levels of investment. Rather, beyond K1 the firm would use any revenue
in excess of the expenditures necessary to finance I* to first retire outstanding
debt until say, at K2 , all debt has been repaid. If as drawn in Figure 11-3,
K2 < K' the firm would want to lend out any revenue in excess of H(I*) if
it can do so at a rate i. The arrowed trajectory in Figure 111-3 depicts the
optimal investment policy when the firm can lend out funds and obtain an
effective rate of return equal to i.
If for some reason the firm was not allowed to lend
or due to risk and/or administrative cost the actual rate of return on lent out
funds is lower than r, then, once all debt had been repaid the firm would rely
only on the increases in revenue brought about by the growth of the capital
stock to self-finance an increasing investment level until the latter is such that,
I =H' 1  (p Fk)
r+8
and the steady state capital stock would be higher than the K' depicted in
Figure 111-3.
Similarly if the effective rate of return the firm could
obtain on lent out funds is i' such that i > i' > r , then at K2, once the firm
had repaid all its debt, it would use any revenue increase to self finance an
increasing investment level until
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I , _1 (p F)Ii + k
Once achieved this level the firm would lend out any
excess of revenue over the expenditures necessary to finance this investment
level.
I
1*1
CASE i = r
K=O
K, K 2 K0
Figure 11-3
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II.-D.3 The Case i < r
When the interest rate on outstanding debt is less
than the opportunity cost of funds to the shareholders, firms starting with a
capital stock such that revenue and credit do not suffice to finance
(p F)
Ir* = H'-1 [ k)
r + 6J
would initially devote all of their revenue and credit resources to invest until
the capital stock has grown to such level, say, K1 , in Figure 11-4 , that
current revenue and credit resources are sufficient to finance the optimal level
I*,. Hereafter any increase in revenue would be used to distribute dividends to
shareholders and in contrast with the case when i > r the firm will not retire
outstanding debt, rather it would increase indebtedness as the growth of the
capital stock increases its credit ceiling. Thus after KI has been reached the
amount of current net revenue devoted to investment expenditures diminishes
as the new borrowings made possible by the growth of the capital stock are
used to displace revenue as a source of finance. Again the arrowed trajectory
in Figure 11-4 depicts the optimal investment policy.
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H'~'[p FK/ ( i + 6)]
H'~'Ip F/( r + 6)
Since with i < r the firm always borrows as much
as possible, the steady state level of indebtedness will be aK . As in Chapter
I, K may be specified in terms of the parameters of the problem by
substituting the optimal investment level
(p Fk)I = H [- ] 0
r + 8'
in the transition law, solving the resulting differential equation and finding the
limit of this solution as t goes to infinity. Thus,
lim D
t-+oo
a (p F)
= aK' = -[ ]' k8 r +]
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i=O
K,
K
Figure 11-4
II.-E. Concluding Remarks.
The discussion of the last two cases, that in which
i > r and that in which i < r, have suggested how in the presence of
financial constraints, the firm's optimal strategy may be composed of several
trajectories which in turn are optimal only for a limited range of values of the
state variable. Furthermore, for the case i = r we took the space to show that
the path that connects such trajectories over the ranges for which they are
optimal is in fact a global optimal policy, i.e. a policy that is optimal as a
whole. For later use in the coming analysis we will state this result in the
following paragraph.
Proposition:
If due to the presence of constraints one trajectory is
optimal for a limited range of the state variable, then the path obtained by
joining said trajectories over the range for which each individual trajectory is
optimal yields a path that is optimal as a whole.
We showed this proposition to be true in the
discussion of the case i = r . A general proof readily follows from Bellman's
(1957) principle of optimality.
In this chapter we have analyzed the effects of
capital market imperfections on the growth strategies of the firm for three
purposes. First, to introduce our way of formalizing and dealing with financial
constraints. Secondly, to study how the investment behavior of the
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neoclassical firm as traditionally studied in the existent literature would be
modified in the presence of financial constraints. Thirdly, although in the next
chapter we question whether in the presence of financial constraints the firm is
the appropriate economic agent for the study of investment behavior, the work
presented in this chapter is meant to be a useful preliminary exercise that
eases, both, the exposition of the techniques and the undertaking of the
forthcoming work.
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Hadley,
III.- Intertemporal Production, Investment and
Consumption by the Self Financed Agent.
III.-A. Introduction.
The problem studied in Chapter II is consistent with
a scenario in which somehow the consumption and investment decisions of
the shareholders are mutually independent. For instance if the firm is owned
by a number of stockholders with diverse utility functions and/or wealth
endowments and as a result, stockholders only agree to instruct management
to maximize profits over the infinite horizon, or equivalently, to maximize the
present value of the cash-flow.
Instead, let us now assume that the firm is owned by
one or a few stockholders with similar utility functions and endowments.
Under these circumstances, saving and investment decisions of the owner(s)
are not mutually independent. Rather, the firm will be administered in such a
way as to maximize the consumption utility of its shareholders. Again, we
shall focus on the case of imperfect capital markets and assume that both the
output and labor markets clear at the current price and wage respectively.
First we shall study the case in which credit is
completely unavailable. Subsequently we will analyze how the results are
modified when firms can borrow up to a constant proportion of their current
capital stock.
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III.-B. The Formal Problem.
Share-holders of the firm will,
Max o
Subject to:
The transition law:
Kt= 1(t) SK(t)
The flow constraint on consumption:
C = pF( )-wL-H(I)
The non-negative constraints on:
the instruments:
I(t) 0
the state variable:
K(t) 0
The initial conditions:
K(0) = K0
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U(C) exp(-r) t dt
L(t) 0 ; C(t) 0
III.-C. The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions.
If we assume Inada conditions for the utility function
then it is natural to suppose that along the optimal path consumption will
never be zero. Then, if output not invested is not storable, we would always want
both, labor and capital to be positive. Although to keep a positive capital stock,
investment need not be positive at all times, the presence of convex costs of
adjusting the capital stock would strongly suggest, at least for the case in which
the initial capital stock is below its steady state level, that along optimal paths,
Investment is always positive. In any case, to ease the exposition we will assume that
neither of the constraints
I(t) > 0; L(t) > 0; C(t) > 0; K(t) > 0;
are binding along optimal trajectories. Should our optimal solution violate any
of these constraints, we would have to modify our analysis accordingly.
The current-value Hamiltonian function for this
problem can then be written as:
H = U(C) + A ( I - K) - y[pF( K, L)- wL - H(I) - C]
From where we may derive the following set of necessary
conditions:
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= AS - ypFk
K = I(t) - SK(t)
C =pF( )- wL -H(I)
A -yH'(I)= 0
y[pFi - w] = 0
U'(C)-y = 0
Replacing y with the value given by the last equation
and since under Inada conditions marginal utility is always positive, with
rearrangements, we may rewrite the set of necessary conditions as:
(1-a) -A + (r) -
(1-b) k = I (t) -
= U'(C)pFk
SK(t)
(1 - c) C = pF( ) - wL - H(I)
(1 - d) A = U'(C)H'(I)
(1 - e) Fi = w/p
As in Chapter 1, if we complement the above set of
necessary conditions with, the following transversality conditions,
lim exp(-r)t A > 0;
t-oO
lim(-r)t A(t)K(t) = 0
t-cw
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-A + rk
The resulting set of equations is both, sufficient and
necessary for optimality.
III.-D. Economic Interpretations of the Necessary Conditions.
Equation (1-a) may be rewritten as
U'(C)pF k + 1 = (r + 6) A
and interpreted to state that the realized return to capital (left
hand side) which is the sum of the marginal revenue product of
in utility units and the capital appreciation ( A ), is equal
to the required return (right-hand side).
Equations (1-b) and (1-c) reproduce the transition
law and the flow constraint on consumption respectively and do not require
further comment.
Equation (1 -d) states that the shadow price of capital
equals the marginal cost of installed capital evaluated in utility units.
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capital
Finally equation (1 -d) states that, again, labor is hired
up to the point where its marginal product equals the real wage.
Now, since at A = 0
dzA /dK2 =1/(r+ 6)[ U'( Op Fk+U"(C) p Fk p Fkk +U"( C) 2pFk p Fkk + U"'(C)pF(pFk)2
We have that if, both, Fkkk and U"' were positive, the
A=0 locus would be a negatively sloped convex curve in the K, A space, but
actually since there is no reason why these third derivatives should be positive, the
A= 0 locus while exhibiting a negative slope has an undetermined shape in regards
to convexity. However, because of the also unrestricted possible shapes of the
k =0 locus, as discussed below, it will be necessary to assume that the A =0 locus is
sufficiently convex in the neighborhood of the steady state in order to insure the
uniqueness of the steady state equilibrium. Since we assumed Inada conditions for,
both, the production and the utility functions, from equation (2) follows that the
A=0 locus is asymptotic to both the K and the A axis.
We draw typical A = 0 loci in Figures III-1-a and III-
1-b with shapes as characterized in the above discussion.
Next we obtain the k =0 locus. From equation (1-b) we
have that k = 0 when I(t) = SK(t). Substituting this value of I in equation
(1-d) we have
A = U'()H'( SK)
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where the right-hand side is the marginal cost -in utility units- of installing an
amount of capital sufficient to sustain a constant capital stock.
x=o
i=0
Figure II-1-a
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I K'' K**Or
k=O
K'" K**
Figure 111-1-b
To study the shape of the k = 0 locus in the K ,A
space we obtain from the last equation
) dA U' ]H"6 + U"dC
(3) -i = KH'(SK) at k =0dK dK
in the right-hand-side, the algebraic signs of all but the second factor in the
second term are known for all K, hence in order to determine the sign of
dA / dK at k = 0 we will examine said factor. To this end, consider that since
along the k = 0 locus we have I = 6K we may substitute this value of I in
equation (1-c) to obtain
C = pF(K, L ) - wL-H(SK)
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or, assuming constant returns to scale,
C = pFkK - H(8K)
As illustrated in Figures 111-2 and 111-3 the difference
of the quasi-convex and the convex functions on the right-hand-side of this
last equation results in a concave function so that initially C increases along
with increases in K until the golden rule level of capital stock, denoted K**,
is reached. Any further increases in K beyond this level would cause a
decrease in C.
C
H
p FK
* K
Figure 111-2
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CFigure 111-3
Secondly, from the last equation we have that, at
k= o
dC
(4) -- pFk - H'( SK )8
and, furthermore,
d 2 C
dK2 -H"( SK )82 at K=O
We read a negative algebraic sign on the right-hand-
side and use this information to draw in Figure 111-4 the shape of the one
before last equation.
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Since we have that at k = 0
K < K**
K > K**
from equation (3) we may now read that, at K = 0
d1A
dK
K < K**
K > K**
So that although the slope and shape of the k = 0
locus is undetermined for K < K** we do know it has a positive slope
for K > K**. We draw typical k = 0 loci in Figures 111-1-a and 111-1-b.
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dC 
> 0dM < 0
> 0
dC/dK
K**
Figure 111-4
The next two questions we investigate are the
existence and uniqueness of a steady state equilibrium and the location of a
"golden rule point" relative to the steady state.
For this purpose, consider the set of necessary
conditions, if we substitute the values of X given in equation (1 -d) in equation
(1 -a) and set i = 0 in the latter equation we derive the following alternative
equation for the i = 0 locus,
(r + 6 )H'(I) = pFk
At the steady state we would have I = 5K
substituting this value of I , the last equation becomes
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(r + 6 )H'(K ) 
Solving for K' from this last equation we obtain the
unique K at which i and k are both equal to zero. Thus,
Ko
1
= - H'[pFK/(r + S)]8
Also observe that the one before last equation
pFk - H'( SK )6 > 0 at Kw
or, in light of equation (4)
dC
> 0 at KO for 0
Using this result in equation (3) it follows that the
sign of the slope of the k = 0 locus at K is undetermined. However from the
last inequality together with the information we have depicted in Figures III-
2, 111-3 and 111-4 we have that since d for
K < K** it must be the case that, Kw < K**
Thus it is clear,
K**, A**, can not exist for K <
K = 0 can be positive only for
both that a "golden rule' point
K' and that there must be one and only on
for a K > K'.
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implies
=pFu
If the existence of a "golden rule" point had turned
out to be possible to the left of K', then we would have had a to distinguish
between the case in which K** < K and the case K' < K**.
For the former case an optimal path would not exist
and we would have had to restrict the analysis to the case K' < K**. As we
have shown K < K** and since we will not assume in the forthcoming
proposition neither that the minimum value of A along the K = 0 locus is
either to the left or to the right of K' , nor that the slope of said locus at K
is either positive or non positive, there will be no need to distinguish between
s III.-l -a and III-1-b.
A brief digression is now in order. Earlier we
mentioned that the problem under study may alternatively be interpreted as a
neoclassical optimal growth model. Lets now view it in this fashion and note
that it only differs from the latter type of models exemplified in the existent
literature by, say Arrow and Kurz (1970; p. 64-81) in that it incorporates a
convex cost of adjusting the capital stock. We then have that although the
structure of the phase diagram in the model above presented is very similar to
the one of the cited neoclassical optimal growth model it does differ in the
important fact that the capital stock level corresponding to a golden rule point
is always larger than the level of the steady state which implies that there will
always exist an optimal path because the possibility that K** < K , which is
present in optimal growth models that do not include convex cost of adjusting
K has been shown to disappear in the present formulation. See Arrow and
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Kurz (op. cit; p. 67-70) for a description of the problem that arises when
K** < Ko.
III.-F. Typology of Paths in the K, A Space.
To analyze the dynamics in the phase diagram, let's
first solve for I form equation (1 -d) to obtain
U'
and substitute this expression for I in equation (1-b) where upon the transition
law may be rewritten as
K=H'~ ()
b). Since [H'~1]'
- K(t)
Now, consider the phase diagram in Figure III- 1 (a or
> 0 the last equation implies that for a given K any point
above the k = 0 locus would have a larger A and hence
k < 0 for any points below such locus.
For any point to the right of the A =
k > 0. Similarly,
0 locus there is
a point on the A = 0 locus with the same A and a smaller K for which A = 0
Since from equation (1-a) we have that
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= -[U'(C)p Fkk + U"(C)(pFk) 2 ] at A = A
where we read a positive sign, then, any point to the right of the A = 0 locus
implies A.> 0. By a similar argument any point to the left of the locus A = 0
implies i < 0.
The i = 0 and the k = 0 loci divide the phase
plane in four quadrants ("Q.") which have been numbered in Figure IV-1
counter-clockwise. In each quadrant the direction of motion is the resultant of
the small arrows given by the arguments in the last two paragraphs.
From the phase diagram it is intuitively clear that
A00, K' ; the steady state, is a "saddle-point" which can only be approached
by the paths beginning either on Q.III or Q.I. But furthermore, for a given
initial K not any path beginning at an arbitrary A(O) in Q. III or Q.I will
approach A', K'. Hence we state the following:
PROPOSITION III.-1:
For any given initial K(0) there exists a determined
A(0) such that the solution of the system:
(1-a) -A +(r+ S)A U'(C)pF k
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dA
-M
(1 - b) K = I(t) - SK(t)
(1 - c) C =pF( ) - wL - H(I)
(1- d) A = U'(C)H'(I)
(1 -e) Fi = w/p
with those initial values converges to the long run equilibrium values A'
K'. If any other initial value A(O) were chosen, the resulting solution would
either diverge to +oo in both variables and clearly be non-optimal or it would
become non-feasible with the capital stock becoming zero in finite time.
III.-G. The Phase Diagram in the , I Space.
From the transition law -equation (1-b) - the k = 0
locus in K, I is the positively sloped line given by
(8) I = 6K
In order to derive an equation for the I = 0 locus in
K, I we first take the time derivative of both sides of equation (1 -d) to
obtain,
A = U"pFkk H' +U" (pFi - w )L H' + U"(-H)i H' + U'H"
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Secondly, substituting in the left-hand side of the last
equation the value for I given by equation (1 -a) we have,
(r+ 6)X - U'(C)pF k = U"pFkkH'+U"(pF - w)L H'+ U"(-H)i H'+ U'H'I
Thirdly, substituting equations (1 -d) and (1 -e) we
have after collecting terms, transposing and multiplying by (-1),
(9) [-U"Hf2 + U'H"] i SU'[ (r + 6) H' - pFk] - U"pFkH' k
Finally, setting i =
equation for the I = 0 locus in the K, I space.
(10) U' [(r + 6) H' - pFk
0 we obtain the
] - U"pF kH' (I - 6 K)
To study the position of this locus in the , I space we
could differentiate totally with respect to the latter set of variables. As this
produces only ambiguous results, we examine each term in the last equation in
order to determine an area within the K, I space where the I = 0 locus may
be located.
Since U' is always positive, the first left-hand side
term in the last equation will equal zero whenever,
(11) (r + 6) H' =pFk
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following
= 0
By totally differentiating
respect to both K and I we have
dI
dK p Fkk/[(r + 6) H"]
this last equation
=pFk
Assuming constant returns to scale Fkk equals zero
hence we have that, in the K, I space, the locus along which (11) holds is a
horizontal line as drawn in Figure 111-5. Any point above
locus implies
(r + 6) H' -pF
and similarly any point below said locus implies
(r + 6) H' pFu
We have placed in Figure 111-5 algebraic signs to denote the regions where
each of the last two inequalities holds.
Consider now the second left hand side term in (10).
Since U" < 0 and assuming H' > 0 for all I 0 it follows that
U"pFkH'(I - 6 K) > 0 if k = I(t) - SK(t)
U"pFkH'(I- 8K) 0 if K=I(t) - 6K(t) 0
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with
at (r + 8) H'
(r+ 6) H' = pFk
0
0
and
0
In Figure 111-6 we have placed algebraic signs to
denote the regions where these last inequalities hold.
Finally, using the loci (r + 8) H' - pFk = 0 and
k = 0 we may divide the K, I space in four quadrants and number them
counterclockwise with roman numerals in Figure 111-7. With the information
depicted in Figure 111-5 and 111-6 we read from equation (10) that the i = 0
locus may lay only in quadrants I and III. We draw in Figure 111-7 a typical
I = 0 locus that lies in said quadrants.
I
(r+ 6) H'= p F,
+
I.
Figure III-5
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Figure 111-6
I
K=o
I2~ II I
000"10 1=0
IV
K'"
Figure 111-7
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III.-H. Typology of Paths in the K, I Space.
Consider the k = 0 locus given by I = 8 K. For any
point in the K, I space, above such locus we would have I > 8 K. Since for
said points I is greater than necessary to have k = 0, it follows that k > 0 at
any point above the k = 0 locus. Similarly k < 0 for any point below the
k = 0 locus. To depict this we place arrow heads in the different quadrants in
Figure 111-7.
The previous section argues that I = 0 was possible only ih .I and Q.III, the
algebraic sign of i in Q.II and IV where I cannot be zero may be established
by first noting that in the left hand side of equation (9) the bracketed factor is
always positive hence the algebraic sing of i will be determined by the right-
hand side of said equation. Using the information depicted in Figures III -5
and 111-6 and equation (9) we establish the sign of I = 0 in quadrants II and
IV and draw the corresponding arrowheads in Figure 111-7.
A precise location for the I = 0 locus can note be
asserted in general, however any particular I = 0 locus would itself divide
each of quadrants I and III in two regions, one above the I = 0 locus denoted
Q.I-a and Q.III-a and one below said locus denoted Q.I-b and Q.II-b . From
equation (9) and the information in Figures 111-5 and 111-6 we may determine
that I > 0 in Q.I-a and Q.III-a and that I < 0 in Q.I.-b and Q.III-b. We place
arrow heads accordingly in Figure 111-7 .
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With this information it is intuitively clear from the
phase diagram that only paths beginning in quadrant I-b and quadrant III-a
could possibly converge to, K', I-* We draw these paths with arrowed curves
in Figure 111-7. Note the saddle point nature of K', I".
We could now assert a proposition similar to
Proposition III-1 with A replaced by !.
Although all paths of the system of equation (1-a
through e) satisfy the necessary conditions, only the two paths that converge
to K", I" would satisfy the transversality conditions and thus qualify as
optimal paths.
Hence we may state the following proposition:
Proposition 111-2
If r > 0 there exists an optimal policy characterized by a particular solution of
the system:
[-U"H'2 + U'H"] 1 = U' [(r + 8) H' - pFk ] - U"pFkH' k
k = 1(t) - SK(t)
For any given K(0) there is only one 1(0) for which
a solution to the above system with such initial values will converge to a limit
and has a positive capital stock everywhere. This solution defines the optimal
path for K(t) and C(t).
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The limit of I(t) along the optimal Pontryagin path is,
I* = H'1 [pFK /(r + 9)]
Since in the steady state,
I* = SK
the limit for the capital stock is
K= ()H'~1[pFK/(r + 8)]
Using the above limits for K and I, from the consumption flow constraint we
obtain the consumption limit
Co = pF(K,L )- wL-H(I*)
Since constant returns to scale have been assumed, also
Co = pFkK - H(I* )
III.-I. The Neoclassical Phase Diagram in the K, I Space.
We now flash-back to Chapter I and construct a
phase diagram for the neoclassical investment analysis so that we may more
easily compare the neoclassical investment solution path with the self financed
house-hold solution as analyzed earlier in this chapter.
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Consider the set of necessary conditions in section I-D for convenience
reproduced below
8 + r)A - pFK(K,L)
(12) H'(I) = A
pFL = W
K= 1-6K
In the above differential equation for A, using equation (12) we first substitute
out A. Then, by taking the time derivative of both side of equation (12) we
obtain
A = H"(I) I
and now use this to substitute out A in said differential equation for A to obtain
H"(I) I = (6 + r)H'(I) pFK
From where we may obtain the following equation of the I = 0 locus in the K,
I space,
H'(I) pFK+ r)
or,
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(13) I = H'' [ + )
We draw this I = 0 locus with a broken line in the K, I space in Figure 111-8
where we have also drawn the k = 0 locus, the equation of which, is again,
obtained from the transition law.
Since equation (13) is also the investment solution path for the constant
returns to scale case we obtained in section I-E in Chapter I, we may denote
the neoclassical solution path with arrow heads along the I = 0 locus in
Figure 111-8
Neoclassical Phase Diagram
The Constant Returns to Scale Case
K=O
H'(p Fj / ( 8+ r) ))>- )>. ->n. - )- 4 - (< -c4< - *<+ i=0
) K
K"K
Figure III-8
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III.-J. Comparison between the Neoclassical Firm and the Self-
Financed Capitalist.
The utility discount rate of the house-hold is the time
preference rate. While the cash-flow discount rate of the neoclassical firm in
Chapter I is the opportunity cost of funds of the share-holders. However, if the
firm is immersed in a "well-behaved" neoclassical economy where the rates
on financial instruments and other investment opportunities have been equated
with the rate of time preference, then, both discount rates are the same. Thus
we may proceed to compare our previous results.
In Figure 111-9 we omit the I = 0 in order not to
clutter the phase diagram and we draw in the K, I space the solution paths,
when returns to scale are constant, obtained in the preceding sections. The
broken arrowed lines are the solution paths for the neoclassical firm while the
continuous arrowed curves are the self-financed house-hold solution paths.
Let us first compare paths beginning with K(O) <
K . Since the house-hold lacks any financial instruments, both, C and I are
financed entirely from current revenue which in turn is proportional to K,
hence the lower the K(0), the lower the feasible C(O) levels, and thus the
higher the opportunity cost of investment funds to the house-hold. This
results in a lower 1(0), the lower the initial K. As the house-hold accumulates
capital, revenue grows and, both, higher I and higher C become feasible, the
latter in turn decrease the house-hold opportunity cost of investment funds,
allowing the house-hold to reach levels of investment closer to those of the
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neoclassical firm, which, unlike the house-hold, faces a constant opportunity
cost of funds (r). However the convexity of H makes higher I increasingly
more expensive, furthermore, as K grows, more I is needed just to make-up
for depreciation. These two effects combine to dampen capital accumulation
so that the house-hold approaches I* and K" asymptotically in time.
Both, the firm and the house-hold approach
asymptotically the same level of capital stock, K". However since the firm is
always investing more than the house-hold, the firm approaches K" faster.
For paths beginning with K(O) > K" we have that
the larger the initial K is, the larger will the house-hold's revenue be and so
will the C it can afford and hence the lower the opportunity cost of investment
funds to the house-hold.
Thus the excess of the house-hold level of I over that
of the neoclassical firm with constant opportunity cost of funds, will be larger
the larger K(O) is.
Since paths to the right of K" have I < S K, K is
diminishing and so in revenue. Thus diminishing the level of affordable C
which by increasing the opportunity cost of investment funds reduce I,
bringing it closer to the level of the neoclassical firm.
As shown in Figure 111-9 for any initial capital stock
larger than K", both, the house-hold and the neoclassical firm approach the
same steady state capital stock. Because the level of I of the firm is always
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below that of the house-hold the firm approaches such K' faster than the
house-hold.
If for any K(O) > Kc the house-hold were to set its
investment level at the level of the neoclassical firm, the lack of any financial
instrument to allow savings would force a temporary consumption glut caused
by the depletion of its "excess capital stock", K(O) - K', over a time horizon
shorter then optimal. Precisely, to avoid this, the house-hold chooses an I(t)
path above that of the firm.
I
k=0
- >34- 30))l
K
Figure 111-9
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III.-K. Treasury Bills and the Self-Financed Capitalist.
Now suppose that the government issues a treasury
bill with a rate of return (s). How would this modify the behavior or the self-
financed house-hold?
First assume s = r
For paths with K(O) < K', the house-hold solution
path for I(t), above obtained, never reached the level of I of the neoclassical
firm with constant returns to scale and constant opportunity cost of funds (r).
Since the house-hold approached such I level asymptotically from below its
rate of return on physical capital is always larger than (r).
Thus for K(0) < K and s = r , the treasury bill is
never a superior investment alternative and the investment solution path will
remain the same than prior to the introduction of the treasury bill since the
house-hold needs to borrow not to lend. For K(O) > K' the previously
obtained investment solution path for the self financed house-hold had a
higher investment level than those profitable for the neo-classical firm with
s = r. Thus the house-hold marginal return on investment was always less
than s.
The introduction of a treasury bill with a rates s = r
by providing a saving instrument with a rate of return higher than along the
house-hold previous solution path, allows the house-hold to separate
consumption and investment decisions.
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Hence upon the introduction of a treasury bill with
s = r, the house-hold will reduce investment on physical capital to the level
optimal for the neoclassical firm with s = r, denote such investment level I*,
there it will obtain a return equal to that of the treasury bill.
To determine the optimal consumption path, the
house-hold will solve a separate problem where it will take into account the
stream of revenue generated by pursuing a constant level of investment in
physical capital as above described.
The flow demand for treasury bills will equal the
excess of current earnings over the sum of current consumption and current
investment expenditures in physical capital, H(Is*).
In Figure III-10 we draw the house-hold solution
path for investment when there exists a treasury bill with s = r.
The results for the case s > r and s < r readily
follows from the above analysis.
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The House-Hold Solution Path when
there exists Treasury Bills with s = r
K
K**
Figure 111-10
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IV. - Intertemporal Production, Investment and Consumption
by the Capitalist in Imperfect Capital Markets.
IV.-A Introduction.
Now allowing the existence of financial
intermediaries we extend the analysis of the preceding chapter and derive the
output, investment and consumption paths when a house-hold may borrow for
investment purposes, up to a constant proportion, denoted "a" of the value of
its current capital stock.
Letting "D" denote outstanding debt the credit
constraint is
D(t) ; a q K(t)
where q price of equipement.
Taking account of borrowings and interest payments,
the flow constraint on consumption now is
C =pF( )- wL-H(I) + b-iD
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and hence, formally the problem of the house-hold may be stated in the
following way.
IV.-B. The Formal Problem.
Max=
Subject to:
The transition law:
00
0
U(C) exp(-r) t dt
k = I(t) - 6K
The flow constraint on consumption:
C = pF( ) - wL - H(I) +
The credit constraint:
D(t) a q K(t)
The non-negative constraints on the controls:
I(t) 0; L(t) 0;
The non-negative constraints on the state variables:
K(t) 0 ; D 0
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(t)
b - i D
C(t) 0
The initial conditions:
K(O) = Ko ; D(0) = Do
IV.-C. The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions.
In the above house-hold problem both sources of
finance, revenue and credit, are an increasing function of the capital stock
level, hence it is natural to conjecture that if the credit constraint is ever
binding along the optimal path, it will be at "low" capital stock levels since it
is for these levels that credit is more attractive because the opportunity cost of
investment funds in utility terms is "high". Also, at "low" capital stock levels,
as illustrated in the preceding Chapter, the optimal investment level is "low"
and this in turn implies that only "moderate" expenditures are needed to
achieve marginal additions to installed capacity.
We will first solve the above problem assuming that
the house-hold must always borrow as much as possible so that the credit
constraint is met with equality at all times and then determine the period when
it would be optimal to do so. Only for this period will the solution derived in
this manner be optimal.
Paths for periods when it is no optimal to borrow as
much as possible will then have to be studied.
Thus, when the credit constraint is binding we have
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= a q K(t)
and consequently, also
b(t) = a q k(t)
Substituting these last two equations in the consumption flow equation we
have
C = pF( ) - wL -H(I) + a q k(t) - i a q K(t)
As in Chapter III we assume that all of the non-negative constraints on, both,
the controls and the state variables are never binding along the optimal
trajectories and since the credit constraint is already embodied
consumption flow constraint, the current value Hamiltonian for this problem
is:
H = U(C)+.A(I- K) + y[pF(KL) - wL - H(I) + aq(I - K) -ia q K- C]
where we have used the transition law to substitute out k in the consumption
flow constraint stated in the one before last equation.
From the preceding Hamiltoninan we may obtain the
following set of necessary conditions:
-A8 + ypFk
k= I(t) -
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- yaqS - yiaq
SK(t)
in the
-A + rA =
D (t)
C = pF( )- wL-H(I)+ aq(I - 8K)
0 = A- yH' (I) + yaq
0= y[pFi - w ]
0 = U'(C) - y
Replacing y with the value given in the last equation, the preceding set of
necessary conditions may be rearranged as,
(1-a) - A+ (r+)A
(1-b) k = 1(t) -
= U'(C)[pF k - aq (6 + i)]
8K(t)
(1 - c) C = pF( ) - wL - H(1) + a q(I - SK)
(1 - d) A. = U'(C)[H'(I)
- i a q K
aq]
(1-e) F = w /p
Again, complementing the above set of necessary
conditions with the following transversality conditions
lim exp(-r)t A > 0;
t--o
lim (-r)t A(t)K(t) = 0
t-+00
we now have a set of equations that is both, necessary and sufficient for
optimality.
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- i a q K
IV.-D. The Phase Diagram in the K, I Space.
An advantage of constructing a phase diagram in the
K, A space is that since the direction of movement of both K and A may be
unambiguously determined for all points in the K, A space, the saddle point
nature of the critical points K', A' is more clearly seen.
However, from the set of necessary conditions in
section IV.-C it is clear that such diagram would be very similar to that in
Figure III -1, thus, we sidestep the analysis of paths in such diagram taking for
granted the saddle point nature of the steady state K', A and continue the
analysis in the K, I space where other aspects are more easily perceived.
Since the algebraic developments in this section
parallel those of section III.-G, the exposition will be less detailed.
From equation (1-b) we obtain the following
k = 0 locus
(2) 1(t) = 6K
which we draw in Figure IV-3.
To obtain the I = 0 locus first we take the time
derivative of both sides in equation (1-d), replace A in equation (1-a), where
we also use equation (I -d) to replace A and thus obtain,
(3) [-U(H' -aq) 2 + U'H] i= U' [(r+ 6) (H'- aq)-(pFk -aqS -aqi] - U"[pFk-aq (5+i)](H' -aq)K
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Setting I = 0 in the last equation we obtain the i = 0 locus in the K , I
space,
(4) U'[(r+ 6)(H'-aq)-(pFk -aq(6+ i))] - U"[pFk - aq (S+i )](H' - aq)k = 0
As in section III.-G, to determine the areas of the
K , I space where the i = 0, is situated we examine each of both terms in the
left hand side of the last equation. By determining the areas of the K, I space
in which each term is positive, zero or negative we may determine the sub
regions of the K , I space where equation (4) may possibly hold. The I = 0
locus would extend along such sub-regions of the K, I space.
Since U' is always positive the first left-hand
side term in equation (4) will equal zero whenever,
[(r + 8)(H' - aq) ] = pFk - aq(8 + i)
We solve out for I in the last equation by first transposing,
(r + 8)H' (I) = pFk + aq(r - i)
Then, dividing by (r + 8) and inverting H'
(5) I = H' 1 [pFk + aq(r - i )]/(r+ 8)]
Since with constant returns pFkk = 0, equation (5)
will be a horizontal line in the K, I space which we represent by the dotted
line in Figure IV-1. The first left-hand side term in equation (4) will be
positive for all points above such line and negative for all points below.
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H''[(p FK+ a q (r - i))/(r +)
U' [(r+6)(H'- a q)-(p FK- a q8- a q i)l
U' I( r+6)(H'- a q)-(pF,- a q6- a qi)]
> 0
< 0
Figure IV-1
Consider now the second left-hand side term in
equation (4). We now direct our attention to the algebraic sign of each factor
in said term.
By assumption,
U" < 0
We will assume the value of the parameters are such that,
pFk - aq(8+ i ) >0
for otherwise the problem under consideration would not be very interesting.
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Considering the third factor in the second left-hand
side term of equation (4), we note that by definition H is the cost of purchase
and installation of equipment i.e.,
H(I) = G(I) + q I
where G (I) is the equipment installation cost function.
From the last equation we obtain,
H'(I) = G'(I) + q
With H'(I) > 0 for all I > 0 we have
H'(I) > q
and since by assumption a < 1, we must have,
H'(I) > a q , for all I
From the last few paragraphs it follows that,
U"[pFk -aq (6 + i )][H'(I) - aq]k
and
- aq]k
> o if k 0
0 if k 0
In Figure IV-2 we draw the locus k = 0 , given
by equation (2) and denote the region of the K , I space in which the
second left-hand side term in equation (4) is either positive or negative.
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U" [pF- -aq (8 + i )] [ H'(I)
U"[p FK - a q (6+i)I[H'(I) - a qj K=0< 0
+
i)I[H'(I) - a qj > 0
K
Figure IV-2
Now by using
Figures IV-l
the information depicted in
and IV-2 together with equation (4) we draw a typical
i = 0 locus in Figure IV-3
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I
IH'1[(p FK+ aq ( r - i)) / ( r + 6)1
1=0
K
K
Figure IV - 3
An analysis similar to that of section III.- H would
yield paths, in the various quadrants of the K , I space similar to those in
Figure 111-7, hence we will also have similar optimal solution paths that
approach a steady state. We draw these optimal paths with arrowhead curves
in Figure IV-3.
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However, such solution paths where derived
assuming that the house-hold would always borrow as much as possible i.e.
that
D= aqK
was compulsory at all times.
Next we will examine the circumstances in which it
is optimal for the house-hold to set D = aqK . Only for such circumstances
would the solution paths sketched in Figure IV-3 be optimal for a house-hold
that could have D ; aqK.
IV.-E. The Phase Diagram in the K, I Space for the Capitalist in
Imperfect Markets.
To derive an equation for an iso-rate-of-return curve
in the K , I space above which the rate of return on marginal investment
expenditures is lower than i, consider a neoclassical firm with an opportunity
cost of funds i, according to the analysis in Chapter I, such firm would have,
I *= H' -1 [pFk Ai +8)
For any K the last equation gives that investment
level at which the firm obtains a rate of return on its marginal investment
expenditures just equal to i. This may be seen explicitly by solving for i in the
last equation, to obtain,
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i = [pFk /H'(I *)] - 6
For any I > I * the rate of return would be lower than i. Ceteris paribus, for
either the house-hold or the firm, higher investment levels imply higher
marginal investment expenditures, H', and hence, lower rates of return.
The optimal investment path derived in the preceding
section for the house-hold that compulsory sets D = aqK, and which we
sketched in Figure IV-3 would be optimal for a house-hold that could have
D < aqK, only for as long as
I < H' -1 [pFk |(i + 6)
Investment level higher than the right-hand side of
the last inequality along the path sketched in Figure IV-3 would not be
optimal for the latter house-hold since they imply a rate of return on marginal
investment expenditures lower than i.
To elaborate this argument more thoroughly first
consider the case with i < r. Then provided that, as previously assumed,
pFk >aq (+i)
we would have,
pF [pFk +aq(r-i)]
k < < pFk/(i + 6)
r+ 6 r+
and consequently
98
pF 1 [_pF_ +aq ( r -i) ] 1(6) H' [ < H-1  < H [pF/(I+ 6)]
Thus when i < r the level of investment below
which the house-hold would be willing to borrow is higher than the steady
state investment level of the self financed house-hold but lower than the
steady state investment level of the house-hold that must set D = aqK.
We mark each of the investment level in inequality
(6) on the vertical axis in Figure IV-4 where we also draw the k = 0 locus
and for visual ease omit the I = 0 loci.
Consider an initial capital stock level, higher then
say, K1 in Figure IV-4, such that the self-financed house-hold optimal path
would have,
I > H'
+
If at such K(O) > K1 we now allow the house-hold
to borrow at an interest rate i, the house-hold would not want to borrow
because the return on marginal investment expenditures would be less than i,
hence the house-hold would continue with the path optimal for the self-
financed house-hold derived in Chapter III and which we draw in Figure IV-4
for K > K1 .
However, since along such path investment is
declining asymptotically towards,
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I = HI1 pF]
Ir + 8
while the capital stock is diminishing, eventually - and before reaching a
steady state - say, at K1, the self-financed optimal path must have,
I = H[1 p
at this point borrowings will be consider, and the optimal self-financed path
that calls for a decreasing I and C with the simultaneous decrease in the capital
stock and revenue will be abandoned, instead the house-hold will avoid such
decrease in C and I by borrowing. Thus once K1 is reached the house-hold will
be able to continue with I and C set constant at the level they were at K1 by
making-up the revenue decreases, due to decreasing K, with decreasing
borrowings. This process will continue until the house-hold reaches its credit
ceiling, say at K2, where we have,
I = HI-
and where,
D = aqK
The house-hold is now borrowing as much as possible and thus the investment
path from K2 onwards is the one derived for a house-hold for whom the last
equation holds at all times and which we previously sketched in Figure IV-3
For K < K2 we draw again such paths in Figure IV-4
CASE i< r
H'-'Ip F/ (i +6 )]
H''[(p FK + a q ( r - i ) ) / ( r +6)]
H'~'Ip FK/(r+6)]
For the case with i > r and assuming pFk > aq (i + 8) we would have,
2] < H'-1 [pFk/(r + 8 )]
Thus, when i > r the investment level below which the house-hold would be
willing to borrow is lower than the steady state investment level of, both, the
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k=0
K2 K,
K
Figure IV-4
I
< I_1 [ pFk + aq ( r -i)
r + 8H p-1 1
self-financed house-hold and the house-hold that must set D = aqK at all
times.
In Figure V-5 we mark each of the investment levels
in the last set of inequalities, in the vertical axis, as before we also draw the
k = 0 locus but omit the i = 0 loci.
Consider initial capital stock levels lower than, say,
K1 in Figure IV-5, at which the optimal path for the house-hold that must
always borrow as much as possible, sketched in Figure V-3 , has
I < H' k
For as long as the above inequality holds, such path will be optimal for a
house-hold that could but did not have to borrow as much as possible i.e, a
house-hold whose credit constraint is
D aqK
This is so because as long as the one before last inequality holds the house-
hold with a credit constraint, as stated in the last inequality, would borrow as
much as possible because its rate of return on marginal investment
expenditures is higher than i .
Along the optimal path for the house-hold that
always must set D = aqK investment is increasing asymptotically towards
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H' [pFk + aq ( -)]
r +8
and hence it must eventually, say at K1, have
I = H 1 p
At this point, the path sketched in Figure V-3 will be abandoned because such
a path call for increasing investment expenditures on which the marginal
return is lower than i.
But because,
H'~ k < H'-1[pFk/(r + 6)]
the house-hold will want to pursue higher investment levels by financing them
entirely form revenue. However, since on such investment expenditures the
rate of return is lower than i , the house-hold would find it more advantageous
to first retire outstanding debt. Thus, at K, the house-hold would set both
investment and consumption fixed at their current level and as the capital
stock increases it will use the increasing revenue to retire outstanding debt.
Only once all debt has been repaid, say at K2, will the house-hold pursue
higher investment levels by financing them entirely from revenue.
Hence, from the time the house-hold reaches K2
onwards the optimal path will be identical to that of a self-financed house-
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hold, studied in Chapter III, that begins with a capital stock equal to K2 . We
draw such a path for K' > K > K2 in Figure IV-5.
The optimal path for a house-hold beginning with
K > K' would also be identical to that of the self-financed house-hold with
such initial capital stock levels. See Figure IV-5.
I CASE i>r
H'~'Ip FK/(r+6)]
H'1 [(p FK+ aq (r - i)) / (r + 6)]
H''[p FK/ (i+6)]
KI K2 Ko
Figure IV-5
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K=0
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V.- Neoclassical Intertemporal Consumption and Saving
Behavior.
V.-A. Introduction.
In perfect capital markets consumption and physical
capital investment decisions area separable, hence there is no need to
distinguish between the economic behavior of those households that own
claims to physical capital and those households who possessing no physical
capital derive their income from wages and/or financial assets, hereafter
referred to as wage earners.
However, when the absence of a market for shares
makes firms investment plans dependent on the credit they may obtain from
financial intermediaries and if the latter set limits to the amount of credit they
are willing to supply to firms, we have that consumption and investment
decisions of shareholders are in general no longer independent of each other,
thus the need to distinguish between households with physical capital and
wage earners. In Chapter IV we analyzed the decisions of the former
households, in this chapter we first study the behavior of wage earners
operating in perfect capital markets in order to have a point of reference when
in the next chapter se consider the effect of imperfect capital markets on the
decisions of the wage earners.
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At any given time wage earners may own a certain
amount of financial assets and cash balances. The financial assets could be
treasury bills of short maturity valued at par, for simplicity we shall consider
them interest bearing time deposits, denoted T, which yield a real interest rate,
"s". The yield on real cash balances, M/P, is equal to the negative of the rate
of inflation, - P/P. In addition, the household is assumed to supply labor
inelastically for which it earn a wage, W.
If C denotes current consumption, the wage earners
transition law will be
i T W PM M
P P P PP P
It seems natural to regard as finite the time horizon
over which the wage earners optimize their economic behavior and as it may
be anticipated, the bequest motive plays a crucial role in determining
appropriate terminal conditions. As argued by Barro (1974) when the current
generation regards the welfare of future generations equal to its own, it is
equivalent to assume infinitely lived households. Thus we shall consider the
wage earners optimization horizon as of infinite length.
Assume, (a) that wage earners derive utility from
consumption and from holding real cash balances which provide no pecuniary
services, (b) that U(C, M/P) has the following standard properties:
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Uc > 0 , UM/p > 0 ,
Ucc < 0, UM2p2 < 0
UCC U M 2  > (UC M/P ) 2
(c) that, to assure the existence of an interior solution,
aU aU
lim - = +00; lim- = 0
c-odC c-owdC
lim = +o 0; m = 0
M/P-*o SM/P M/P-*ow a M/P
In this chapter, wage earners are regarded to operate
in perfect financial markets by which we mean: (a) that the individual may
barrow and lend at the same rate, s ; (b) that their debt or credit ceiling is
determined only by its net worth, which is equal to the present value of its
future income stream discounted at a rate s; (c) however, at any point in time,
the short run rate of interest may be greater, equal or less than the time
preference rate, r.
Hence the debt constraint in perfect credit markets,
as characterized above is,
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T 1 W
P s P
T
where - -P denotes real debt.
After the foregoing discussion we may now state the
wage earner household problem formally.
V.-B. The Wage Earner Formal Problem.
Max. fU(C, M/P ) exp. -r t dt
Subject to:
The flow constraint on consumption,
i T
-=S -
P P
+
W PM
-C
P PP
M
The indebtedness constraint,
T 1
P-S
W
P
The non-negative constraint on the instruments,
108
C(t) 0 M(t) 0P
The initial condition,
T(0) T
-
0P P
V.-C. Bibliographical Note.
The study of the optimal economic behavior of the
household when consumption is the only argument of the utility function
emphasizing its intertemporal nature by considering wealth and not income as
the main determinant of consumption has been previously undertaken by Cass
and Yaari (1967) for the case of a finite horizon with a bequest motive and by
Arrow and Kurz (1970) for an infinite horizon. When cash balance are
introduced as an additional argument of the utility function the following
complication arises, the flow constraint is not determined independently of the
choice of money balances and thus we do not have a well defined problem.
Mussa (1974) solves the above stated problem by reformulating it in such a
way that the flow constraint depends only on variables beyond the household
control time t. The advantages of providing in this chapter an alternative
specification are that, (a) it will allow us to readily extend the solution
obtained for the capital owner household problem of Chapter IV to the case
when money and other financial assets are additional arguments of the utility
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function and appear in the portfolio; (b) it will allow us to consider a claim
made by Arrow and Kurz ( op.cit.) relevant to the analysis of wage earners in
imperfect capital markets; (c) by preserving the concavity of the resulting
Hamiltonian function, we ease the proof of optimality of the solution since the
necessary conditions will also be sufficient.
No new results will be obtained in this chapter. We
only present a different approach and show that it yields the same results than
those previously obtained by Mussa (op.cit.). The purpose is to propose and
illustrate the approach which we shall use in the next chapter for the analysis
of wage earners in imperfect capital market.
V.-D. The Alternative Approach.
We will break-up the wage earner household
problem in two stages: one that deals with the intertemporal choice and one
that deals with the atemporal aspect of the problem.
For these purposes we shall assume that the non-
pecuniary services of cash-balances area valued by the household at their
opportunity cost, s, so that we may define total expenditure, Z as
M
z = C+s-
First we will solve for the optimal intertemporal total
expenditure path. Then, in a second stage, we solve a static optimization
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problem at each point in time in order to determine the allocation of optimal
total expenditure level, Z, between its two components, consumption and
services of cash balances assuming a utility function with a constant elasticity
of marginal utility of total expenditure, denoted u, the set of preferences that
satisfy this condition may then be characterized by,
1
U (C,M/P) = 1-a ( C, M/P) for a # 1
Using our previous definition of total expenditure we
may rewrite the last equation as,
1 Z'
U (C,M/P) = E(T)
where E is a function of s, and represents the cost associated with a unit of
utility of p. Since for any homothetic function p, E is not a function of Z(t),
the first stage of the wage earner household problem may now be formalized
as in the following section.
V.-E. Alternative Specification.
Wage earners will,
Max. f 0 Z1- exp.-r t dt
0
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Subject to:
The flow constraint on consumption,
i T W
-= s- + - - Z
P P P
The indebtedness constraint,
T 1 W
P S P
The non-negative constraint on the control,
Z > 0
The initial condition,
T(O)
P
T
- 0P
V.-F. The Necessary Conditions.
The first stage of the household problem is now
formally identical to the problem by Arrow and Kurz (op.cit.p.155). Its
solution follows.
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Since we assumed Inada conditions for the marginal
utility function we would expect that along the optimal path, total expenditure
will always be positive so that the non-negative constraint on Z will not be
binding and hence we will ignore it. We shall also neglect the net indebtedness
constraint as it will turn out that this constrains is always satisfied. Thus we
may write the following Hamiltoninan,
1 T W
i{ = Z-" + <p(s- + -- Z)1-a P P
From where we may obtain the following set of necessary conditions
(1-a) Z-"= p
(1-b) p -r = -sq
Tl T W
(1-c) -=s- + - - ZP P P
Although the indebtedness constrains may never be
actually binding, it always holds, hence we may complement the above set of
necessary conditions with the following transversality conditions that holds in
perfect financial markets as characterized above
T 1W
(1 - d) lim -- --
t -+o P s P
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V.-G. Solution Paths.
Solving (1-b) we obtain,
<(t) = <p(0) exp. (r - s) t
Substituting this solution of p (t), in the right hand side of (1-a) and solving
out for Z(t) we obtain,
Z(t) = <(0)-'/" (r - s)exp.- t
Defining,
Z (0)
we have,
(2) Z (t) Z(O) exp.- (r-s t
a7
To determine the value of Z (0) we first solve (1 -c) with Z (t) as given in the
last equation to obtain,
T rT(O)
(3) = [-+
1W Z(O) 1
s P (r-s)/a + s Ixpst
1 W
s P
+ Z(O)(r-s)/a + s exp. -(r-s)/at
Secondly, we use the transversality condition (1 -d) to solve for Z(0).
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For this purpose, note that as long as
(4)
(r - s)
The first r.h.s. term in (3) will be dominant, so that if
Z(O) > [T(O) 1WPS PI [(r -s)/ a
The dominant term approaches -oo and the transversality condition will not
be fulfilled. On the other hand, if,
[T(0)
P
1W]
[(r
The transversality condition is always satisfied but T(t)
non-negative if Z(O)
would still be always
were increased by a sufficiently small amount and this
would provide a higher consumption path at all points in time, Thus optimality
requires
Z(O) + s] [T(O) + 1W
Substituting the value of Z(O) in (2) we obtain the optimal expenditure path,
(5) Z*(O) + s] [T+ ] Wexp - t[(r - s)/ a
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+ s]
Z(O) + s]
= [(r- s)/ a
When,
s < -(r - s)/ a
the preceding argument does not hold and we conclude from (3) that there is
no optimal policy. However, this last inequality is not possible if a >
We now proceed to the second stage
1
of the
household problem and solve a simple static optimization problem to obtain
the optimal paths for consumption and money balances. If for simplicity we
let p( C, M/P) be a Cobb-Douglas function, the problem is
= Ca (M/P) 1 a O<a < 1
Subject to,
= C + s(M/P)
and the solution is
t) = a Z* (t)
1
= (1 - a)-Z*(t)S
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Max <
Z *
C*
M*
-(t)
Substituting the value of Z
express the optimal path of
(6) C*(t)
C and M/P as functions of initial wealth,
exp - (r - s)/u t
(7) -(t)
P
s] r+ ! ]exp - (r - s)/o t
These equations are the same solutions as those obtained by Mussa (p.91;
op.cit.) and cross-checks our alternative approach.
V.-H. The Role of the Rate of Return on Financial Assets.
When r = s we read from equation (5) the total
expenditure equals current income, i.e.,
Z*(t) TS 5-
P
+
w
P
So that the amount of financial assets remains constant and the credit
constraint is never approached. From (6) and (7) it follows that expenditures
on C(t) and M(t)/P will equal a constant proportion, a and (1 - a)/s
respectively, of current income.
If s > r , again from equation (5) we have that Z
is less than current income. The difference allows for the accumulation of
financial assets which in turn permits expenditures on consumption and
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stated in (5) we may
a[(r - s)/u +
1- (a - s /o +
s] [L-)+ I
services of cash-balances to grow exponentially. Since financial assets are
being accumulated the indebtedness constraint will not be approached.
Lastly, when s < r again from equation (5) we
have that total expenditure is larger than income and is declining
exponentially while the indebtedness constraint is being approached
asymptotically in time and from above so that it never becomes actually
binding. This last claim can be verified by substituting the solution for
Z*(0) in (3) to obtain,
T~t)1W T7(0) 1
=~) + + 1W exp. -(r - s)/o-tP S P P SP
so that when s < r we have,
1 W
lim T(t) =
t->oo s P
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VI. - Intertemporal Consumption and Savings of Wage
Earners in Imperfect Capital Markets.
VI.-A. Introduction.
The preceding chapter proposed an approach in
which the household economic behavior was analyzed in two steps, one that
dealt with the intertemporal choice and another that dealt with the atemporal
aspects. Using and extending this approach, this chapter studies the economic
behavior of household without physical capital, who derived their income
from wages and/or assets and are immersed in imperfect financial markets
which are characterized by the following properties: (a) households may
barrow only up to a fraction, denoted g , of the present value of their income
stream; (b) the lending rate s -which is the return on financial assets- and
the borrowing rate j are such that j > s ; (c) s may be greater, equal
or smaller then the pure time preference rate, r .
Thus under imperfect financial markets the household without physical capital
faces the following pair of indebtedness constraints
(1) T 0
(2) jD 5 g
It is now useful to consider the case when g is zero
so that D is also zero at all times. Then, the problem of the wage earner
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household in imperfect capital markets may be formalized as in section V.-E
but with the indebtedness constraints replaced by (1).
Thus if as in section V.-F we again ignore the
indebtedness constraint in the formulation of the Hamiltonian we would, of
course, obtain the same set of necessary conditions, which would now be
complemented by the following transversality condition
lim T(t) > 0
t-c~o
We now use this transversality condition to determine Z*(0) from equation V
- 3, again as long as s > -(r - s)/o the dominant term is the first r.h.s.
term in V - 3 thus by an analogous argument as that given for the perfect
capital markets case we must set
Z*(0)= [(r - s)/ o- + s] +
IP S P
This causes the first r.h.s. term in V -3 to vanish,
leaving the long run limit of T(t) to be determined by the remaining terms.
Now when V-4 holds and s > r the dominant term in V-3 will be the
third r.h.s. term so that T(t) will be growing monotonically and
consequently the indebtedness constrain will never be approached, hence it
turns out innocuous to have ignored it in the formulation of the Hamiltonian.
When s < r the dominant term in V- 3 becomes the second r.h.s. term
1 W
so that T(t) converges asymptotically in time and from above to -PS P
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In the perfect capital markets case this presents no problem as this is precisely
the credit constraint , but for the imperfect capital markets case this solution of
T(t) would eventually violate the credit constraint (1) and therefore is not
feasible, let alone optimal.
Arrow and Kurz (p.155-156 Op. Cit.) claim that for
the problem presented in section VI.-E if s < r and if the transversality
condition is
lim T(t) > 0
t-oo
"there would be no optimal policy".
Below we will first argue that an optimal policy does in fact exist for this case
and characterize such policy. Then in light of this result we will extend the
approach proposed in the preceding chapter in order to analyze the wage
earners decisions in imperfect capital markets.
To show the existence of said solution we first
consider an optimal consumption policy for a household who receives a
constant salary but does not possess financial assets, operating in imperfect
capital markets so that the interest rate on available financial assets s , the
borrowing rate j and the pure time preference rate r are such that
s 5 j < r
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Such household would certainly not want to devote any of its income to the
acquisition of financial assets; rather it would prefer to borrow. But, if under
imperfect capital markets the household is not permitted to borrow against its
future salary stream the best it can do is to devote the entire salary to current
consumption and thus it's optimal total expenditure path would be,
W
Z*(t) =
We now ask how the consumption policy stated in
the last equation should be modified when the household, still facing s < j <
r and unable to borrow against its future wage stream, is endowed with
financial assets. For this purpose consider the class of utility functions used by
Arrow and Kurz (op.cit.) in which the marginal utility of total expenditure has
a constant elasticity, -. Since U' must be proportional to Z-- we have,
U' = Z-
Integrating both sides we obtain
1
U(Z) = Z~" + A
where A is a constant.
Since there is no reason why the possession of
financial assets should by itself modify the desire of the household to spend all
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its salary on current consumption, its expenditure level will equal its salary
plus expenditures financed from its financial endowment, denoted Z.
We thus have,
(3) Z(t) =Z(t) + W/P
Using this expression of Z(t) the transition law of section V.- E now becomes
iP T
P P
If we identify A with the constant amount of utility from spending the entire
salary the utility level is
1
U(Z) = 2'-" +
We may no state the household problem in the following way
VI.-B. A formalization with a Non-negative Constraint on
Assets.
The household will,
21-a +
a
A} exp.-rtdt
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A
Max.
0 -
Subject to:
P T
-=S- Z
P P
The indebtedness constraint,
T
> 0
The non-negative constraint on the control
Z+A >
The initial condition
T(0)
P
VI.-C. The Necessary Conditions.
Since the Inada conditions imply that the constraint
on the control will never be binding along an optimal path and since we will
show that along an optimal path the indebtedness constraint is approached
asymptotically in time and from above, we may ignore said constraints an
write the following Hamiltonian,
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0
T
= -o
P
[7= 21-a1-cx
T
+ A + <(s-
P
From where we obtain the following set of necessary conditions,
(3 -a) Z- = cp
(3-b) # -rp = -s(
i'(3 -c)
P
T
Ss -- Z
P
VI.-D. Solution Paths.
Solving equation ( 3 - b) , substituting this result in
equation ( 3-a) and solving out for Z(t) we obtain,
(t) = <p-1' (0) exp.- t
Letting,
Z(0) 9p- 1/a (0)
We have
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2)
(4) Z*(t) (0) exp. (r - s) t
Substituting this solution for 2 in the transition law, (3-c), we obtain
1 T
-= S
P P
- Z(O) exp. (r - s) t
Which solution is
(5) T(t)
P
[T(O)
I--
Z(0) s
(r-s)/a + s] exp s t +
2(0)
(r-s)/a + s exp.{-(r-s)/alt
Again restricting the analysis to the case
S (r- s)
by an argument similar to that given in section V.-G for the determination of
Z*(0) , we have,
Z*(0) = [(r - s)/ u + s
Substituting the last equation in (4 ) using (2), we may now characterize the
optimal expenditure strategy,
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(6) Z*(t) [(r - s)/ a + s] T(0) exp.{-(r - s)/-}t +
This is the solution that Arrow and Kurz (p. 156; op. cit.) claim does not exist.
To obtain the solution path for T (t) substitute the value of Z*(0), as given in
the one before last equation in (5) to obtain
T(t) T5()
P exp. s)/o-}t
When s > r, 1(0 is growing monotonically and the indebtedness constraint,P
> 0, is not being approached. When s < r the indebtedness constraint is
being approached asymptotically in time and from above, hence regardless of
whether s r or s < r, the indebtedness constrain never becomes actually
binding and it is innocuous to ignore it in the formulation of the Hamiltonian.
If we believe r > 0, how could we explain the empirical evidence of growing
T(t) with s 5 0?
Among a host of possible explanation,
illusion, lagged adjustment, irrational behavior, etc., we want to study the
holdings of TIP as mean for the household to accumulate purchasing power
for later use in the acquisition of durable goods, denoted R. The household
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W
money
prefers to accumulate purchasing power by holding T/P instead of M/P
since s > -
P
The real yield on durables, denoted n, will be the
sum of the value of the services rendered by the durable - as a percentage of
its value- plus real net appreciation ( i.e., the rate of real appreciation minus
the rate of depreciation which we assumed to be a constant percentage of its
real value). The value imputed to the services rendered by durables is the cost
of hiring an equivalent service.
If n > s, the household would prefer to hold
durables instead of financial assets and the household transition law becomes
A R W
-=n- + -- - zP P P
However, this transition laws has a different
interpretation than the transition equation given for the accumulation of
financial assets in section V.-E. In general the markets for the services of
durables will not be developed to an extent such that the household can rent-
out a durable good R and obtain an income n R, rather direct use of the
durable is needed to obtain a yield n. But as long as the services provided by
the durables can be perfectly substituted for current expenditure on non-
durables goods and services, the last equation may be used as the transition
law equation and the problem of the household may be formalized as in
Chapter V.
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We shall first assume such perfect substitutability but
at the end of this section we shall consider some alternatives.
For many wages earner household, durables may be
priced above what they can save out of current income, also, for a large
number of durables there does not exist a continuum of values over which a
smooth accumulation could take place. For this and other reasons, in practice
the accumulation of durables is bound to be discrete and not smooth. Even
when such continuum is provided by a well developed market for used
durables, transaction cost, from which we have abstracted, would still make
for a discrete acquisition of durables.
To illustrate this point, assume that there is only one
type of durable (e.g. automobiles) for which there exists a second-hand market
which provides a continuum of values and for which R(t) in Figure VI-1-a
represents the optimal smooth accumulation path in the absence of
transactions costs. Now, if step increases in R(t) by a constant amount TIP
are required in order to make it worthwhile to the household to incur in the
associated transaction cost, then the actual discreet accumulation path would
be R'(t), in Figure VI-1-a. Thus, at t = 1, the household whose associated
optimal smooth accumulation path is R (t) would begin accumulation financial
assets until, t = 2, when it would sell the old durable and use this revenue
together with accumulated financial assets to purchase a durable of value
R(2)/P. At t=3, this process would repeat itself.
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The time profile of the holdings of T/P associated
with the above described discreet accumulation process of the durable is
depicted in Figure VI-l-b.
So that once obtained the optimal path R*(t) and with a given TIP we could
obtain, both R'* (t) and an associated path of financial assets to be held for the
acquisition of durables.
ACCUMULATION OF DURABLES
R
R2 - - -- -- -- ---
R1 ------ 
-/
t, t2  ) t
Figure VI - 1 - a
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HOLDINGS OF FINANCIAL ASSETS
T / p
i/p }= 1g-1t-t1
ti t2
Figure VI - 1 - b
VI.-E. Demand for Quasi-liquidity and the Household
Atemporal Problem.
Even when financial assets have a rate of return
lower than that of durables, if the latter are not easily marketable, the
household may still demand a certain amount of T/P for liquidity purposes.
Then, if holdings of T/P provide less liquidity than money but more liquidity
than durables we may regard holdings of T/P as providing quasi-liquidity.
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To obtain the optimal allocation of a given current
total expenditure, Z(t), among nondurable goods and services C, cash
balances services, M/P and quasi-liquidity services T/P, we need to specify
the instantaneous utility function of the household and in this context the issue
of substitutability among the several goods and services plays an important
role. One possibility is to have an homogenous instantaneous utility function
with an elasticity of substitution equal to one among the three different goods,
the household atemporal problem could then be written as,
Max p = CalMaT1a1 +a2
where 0 < al, a2, {1 - (al+ a2)} < 1
Subject to ,
M T
Z(t) = C + n - + (n - s) -P P
However this particular p function implies an equal elasticity of substitution
among its three arguments which would not exist if, as it seems likely, the
household regards T/P and M/P to be more similar between each other than
with regard to C. To overcome this deficiency we want to specify a simple
instantaneous utility function, yet one that captures this important aspect. For
this purpose we group T/P and MIP in one category of goods, name it
financial services denoted B.
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Now we can form a Cobb-Douglas instantaneous utility function with the
arguments being consumption goods and services, C, and the household
instantaneous problem is,
Max CaBi-a 0 a <
Z* = C + B
Which solution is,
C*(t) = aZ*(t)
B*(t) = (1 - a)Z*(t)
To decide the allocation between cash balances and
time deposits of the share of total expenditure to be spent on financial services
the household then solves the following subsidiary problem,
Max B = [ STP
P
+
(1 - 8)M-P
P
-
1 < p < oo
0 < 6 < 1
Subject to
1
where,
-1/p
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Subject to, (1-a) Z*(t) MP + (n - s) -
which solution is,
M 1
-= - #M(1-C)Z (t)P n T
T 1
P =T (1
P n-s -F
and where
PlM
T
= (81/(1+P)) / [1 - )1/(1+8)(n)-P/(1+P) + S1/(1+P)]
pT = (1- 8)1/(1+P) 61/(1+P)( n)P/(1+P) + (1
P
- 5)1/(1+P)I
We may now assume that the elasticity of substitution between T/P and M/P is
greater than unity so that -1 < P < 0
Thus PT/P will be an increasing function of s and since it can be shown that
PT/P + PM/P = 1 we have that an increase in s would cause an increase in
T/P and a decrease in M/P.
However, a change in s does not affect either of the
shares of Z(t) devoted to financial services or current consumption. This is, of
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course, due to our assumption of an elasticity of substitution between
consumption and financial services equal to one.
Alternatively, we may consider the case in which an
increase in s would not only cause an increase in T/P and a reduction in M/P
but also a reduction in C. This would happen if, for example, the instantaneous
utility function exhibits an elasticity of substitution greater than one among its
three components so that p may be written as,
i T P M ~P J/
<p = 1- + S2 - + (1 - 1 - 2z)C-PP P
where, p < 1
and, 0 < 61, ,62 (1- 81 - 62) < 1
However, written in this way the above instantaneous
utility function implies an equal elasticity of substitution among the three
arguments which as mentioned before would not obtain if the household, as it
seems likely, regards T/P and M/P to be closer substitutes of each other than
of C.
Nevertheless, both properties: (a) an elasticity of
substitution greater than one between consumption and financial services
which would cause C to decrease if s increases and (b) and elasticity of
substitution between T/P and M/P greater than that between B and C, may be
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portrayed with a two-level C.E.S. function in which first, T/P and M/P are as
before grouped together in an argument, denoted B, of a two argument C.E.S.
function where C is the other argument and where the elasticity of substitution
is a constant greater than one but less than that of a subsidiary C.E.S. function
which serves to determine the allocation between M/P and T/P of the share of
total expenditure to be spend on financial services. The household atemporal
problem would then be,
Max < = [6B-P2 + (1 - 8) C-P2] 1/P2
where
0 > P2 > P1 > -
0 < 6 <1
Subject to,
M T
Z*(t) =C + n - + (n-s) -
P P
Setting P2 > p1 will make the elasticity of substitution between B and C less
than that between T/P and M/P.
The budget shares that appear in the solution for C,
and M/P and T/P in the above problem will be cumbersome expressions. But,
since at this point we are interested only in noting some properties of the
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resulting demand functions which are peculiar to this last formalization of the
household atemporal problem, we express said solutions by noting only the
parameters and variables that are arguments of the budget shares. Thus the
solutions are,
C(t)
M
- (t)P
T
- (t)
dc (a, P1, P2 ,n, s) Z*(t))
1 
_
n
P (a,Pi, P2,n,s) Z*(t))
1
n - s r/P ( 0 ,Pi P2,n,s)Z*(t))
An increase in s would again cause a decrease in M/P
and an increase in T/P but now C decreases. Thus, because of the relative
values we assumed for the different elasticities involved, the effect of an
increase in s would be such that,
dC
> 0 > -
ds
dM/P
ds all derivatives evaluated at Z=
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dT/P
ds Z*
VI.-F. Credit Availability to Wage Earner Household in
Imperfect Financial Markets.
The last two preceding sections have addressed the
role of durable goods as an alternative mean of holding wealth and have study
the holding of financial assets for the purpose of, both, supporting the process
of accumulation of durables and providing quasi-liquidity services in the
context of the household atemporal problem.
Before studying the intertemporal problem of wage
earner household who hold their wealth mainly in material assets such as
durables and real estate, we need to establish their credit constraint. For this
purpose we shall consider households that may borrow up to certain fraction
of their wealth which at any given time is
T 1W R
tott) = ~-= + -
P j P P
It seems reasonable to assume that credit granted by
financial intermediaries will not be a fraction of total wealth as a whole but
influenced by its composition. If we denote with f, g, and h the fractions of,
respectively, financial assets, discounted wage income and durable goods up
to which the household may barrow, the credit constraint may then be written
as,
D T gW R
P ~ P j P P
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where f * g # h if financial intermediaries perceive the various wealth
T 1w R
components, ,, .1, and as providing different degrees of guarantee
against credit granted.
Because in general ownership of financial assets may
be easy to change without necessarily incurring in large capital losses or
transaction costs and without financial intermediaries being able to control
such ownership, we will regard f as zero. Similarly if credit granting
institutions regard R to be more secure collateral than expected wage income
we would expect g < h, however in what follows we shall not assume that
this last inequality holds.
Thus, the debt constraint of the wage earner
household se shall hereafter work with shall be,
D g W R
- < gw+ h -
P ~j P P
For future reference we note that since this inequality
holds at all times, it will also hold in the limit, i.e.,
D(t) gWRlimt <t _ + h-
P j P P
Taking account of current borrowings and of interest
payments on outstanding debt, the transition law for the household that holds
wealth mainly in the form of durable goods becomes,
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R
P
+ w
P
We may now set
Z + b
P
the
jD
P
wage earner household
intertemporal problem in the following way
VI.-G. The Formal Intertemporal Problem with Material Assets.
co
Max. foU(Z) exp. -r t dt
Subject to,
The transition law,
A
P
R
n P + 
w
P
Z+ b
P
jD
P
The credit constraint,
D
P
<g W
j P
R
+ h-P
The non-negative constraint on the state variable,
R
> 0
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A
P
The non-negative constraint on the control variable
Z > 0
The initial conditions
R(0) Ro
P P
D(0)
P
Do
P
VI.-I. The Necessary Conditions.
Before proceeding to solve the above stated problem
we note some relative magnitude relations among the various rates, s, n,
j, which will allow us to express the transition law in a more convenient form.
First note that the household problem as formalized
T
above implicitly assumes n > s since otherwise - would be a dominant asset
in the sense that it offers both, a higher return and more liquidity than material
assets and would thus displace the latter as a means of holding wealth.
It seems also reasonable to assume j s, since
credit granting institutions are not likely to have rates such that by depositing
borrowed funds in time deposits the households would be making a profit at
the expense of the credit institutions.
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However there seems to be no reason why we should
assume eitherj > s or j < s. If j > s the households will never borrow since
neither in material assets nor in time deposits (since n > s) would they
obtain a return large enough to compensate for interest payments. Similarly if
n > j the household would borrow as much as possible. Lastly when n = j
the household would in principle be indifferent between borrowing as much as
possible and nothing at all, for definiteness we assume that to establish and/or
consolidate credit history the household borrows as much as possible. Hence,
0 for j > n
D = gW R
+ h y for j : n
and consequently,
0 for j > n
D -=
h y for j ! n
Substituting the last two equations in the transition
law of the preceding section we obtain,
W
nR + Z for j > n
R z
+n - jh 1 - g W n .1 - fh R + 1 -h P 1 - fo
For ease of notation define,
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n for j > n
mi n- jh 
.o :
1 -h for n
1 for j > n
M 2  = 1-g .
1-h for 1 n
1 for j > n
M 3  1 h for j : n
So that the last transition law may be rewritten as
A R W
m 1 - + m 2 - - m 3 ZP P P
In the solutions of wage earner household problem
we have previously study, when the return on assets was greater than the time
preference rate, the credit constraint never became binding since the optimal
trajectories we obtained were characterized by asset accumulation. However
for the case in which n < r the conjecture that our previous work suggests is
that along the optimal path, the stock of material assets will be depleted and
the concern about whether the credit constraint might become binding is
justified. We shall focus on the case n > r and disregard the credit
constraint, although we will verify whether it ever becomes binding along the
optimal trajectories we obtain when n > r.
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As before, we also ignore the nonnegative constraint
on Z because we have assumed Inada conditions for the marginal utility
function.
Thus we may write the following Hamiltonian,
R
17f = U(Z) + < m1 W+ M2 -
From where we obtain the following set of necessary conditions:
(9-a) U'(Z) =
(9-b) ca - rp = -mi p
(9-c) P
P
R
P + 
m 2 P
VI.-J. Solution Paths.
Solving equation (9-b), substituting this result in
equation (9-a), assuming a constant elasticity of the marginal utility of total
expenditure and solving out for Z(t) we obtain
Z*(t) = p- 1/a(0) exp. - ml) t
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m 3 Z)
- m 3 Z
Defining,
Z*(0) =
we have,
(10) Z*(t) = Z*(O) exp.
Substituting this solution for Z*(t) in (9-c)
(r -mi)
- t
a-
and solving the resulting
differential equation we obtain,
(11)
Pt [P m2 Wm
P P mi P
m 3 Z(O) exp.mit
(r-mi)/a + mi I
m2 W m3 Z(O) exp. - (T-ml)/at
mi P (r-mi)/a + mi
To solve for Z(0), note that as long as m, > -( r - mi)/o- the first r.h.s.
term in the last differential equation will be dominant so that if
1 R(0) m2 WZ(0) > - I + [(r
m 3 P m 1 P
- mi)/a + m 1 ]
the dominant term approaches - oo and the constraint on the state variable
would be violated.
If, z(0) < + m1 ]
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1 [ (0,+ )2f [(r - mi)/o
the non-negative constraint on the state variable, R, would not be violated but
said constraint would still be always satisfied if Z(O) were increased by a
sufficiently small amount and this would provide a higher consumption at all
points in time. Thus, for optimality we need,
1 R(0)
M3 P
M2W] [(r - mi)/U + m1]
mi PI
Substituting this value of Z(O) in (9) we obtain the optimal expenditure path,
(12) Z*(t) 1[( O + 2 [(r - mi)/ + m1] exp - (r - mi)/6t
Substituting the value for Z*(0) given in the one
before last equation in to (11) we have the solution path for durable goods,
R*(t) R(O)
P P
To obtain the solution paths
Mn2 W
in1 P
mz2 W
+ exp.
m 1 P
- (r - mi)/Ut
for C(t), M(t), and ,(t) weP P need only
substitute the solution for total expenditure given by (12) in the atemporal
solutions previously obtained.
Adopting, for instance the last formalization of the household atemporal
problem presented in section VI-E we have,
C*(t)
M*
P
dc Z*(t))
=- a/IP Z*(t))
n
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Z*(O)
